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Abstract
In non-relativistic Bohmian mechanics the universe is represented by a probabil-
ity space whose sample space is composed of the Bohmian trajectories. In relativistic
Bohmian mechanics an entire class of empirically equivalent probability spaces can
be defined, one for every foliation of spacetime. In the literature the hypothesis
has been advanced that a single preferred foliation is allowed, and that this foli-
ation derives from the universal wave function by means of a covariant law. In
the present paper the opposite hypothesis is advanced, i.e., no law exists for the
foliations and therefore all the foliations are allowed. The resulting model of the
universe is basically the “union” of all the probability spaces associated with the
foliations. This hypothesis is mainly motivated by the fact that any law defining a
preferred foliation is empirically irrelevant. It is also argued that the absence of a
preferred foliation may reduce the well known conflict between Bohmian mechanics
and relativity.
1 Introduction
In non-relativistic Bohmian mechanics [3, 12, 8, 6, 7] the universe is represented by a
probability space whose sample space is composed of the Bohmian trajectories. The
actual trajectory of the universe is assumed to be a trajectory chosen at random from this
space. In the relativistic domain the definition of the probability space requires selecting
a foliation of spacetime; the selected foliation is however not empirically detectable, and
the probability space generated by any foliation can be an empirically adequate model of
the universe [3, 7, 2, 5]. The need of a foliation creates some conflict between Bohmian
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mechanics and relativity, even if there is not an obvious criterion which states clearly if
a theory is compatible or not with relativity [2, 4, 5, 14]. In order to reduce this conflict,
in [5] the hypothesis is advanced that a single preferred foliation is allowed, and that this
foliation derives from the universal wave function by means of a covariant law.
In the present paper the opposite hypothesis is advanced, namely that there is no law
for the foliations, neither dynamical nor statistical. This means that all the foliations are
allowed, and no probability measure is defined on the set of the foliations. This hypothesis
will be synthetically referred to as the no-law hypothesis.
The no-law hypothesis leads naturally to a model of the universe which is basically
the “union” of the probability spaces associated with all the foliations; such a model will
be referred to as the no-law model. A remarkable feature of this model is that the random
choice of a trajectory from the sample space is governed by a set function which is not a
probability measure.
The main motivation for the no-law hypothesis is the fact that, due to the complete
unobservability of the foliation, any law for the foliations is empirically irrelevant. However
it is also argued that the absence of a preferred foliation in the no-law model may reduce
the conflict between Bohmian mechanics and relativity. Both these subjects are discussed
in Section 5.
The plan of the paper is the following: in Section 2 non-relativistic Bohmian me-
chanics and its interpretation are presented; in Section 3 relativistic Bohmian mechanics
is presented; in Section 4 the no-law model is developed; in Section 5 some conceptual
issues are discussed.
For simplicity, in this paper the mathematical details relative to σ-algebras and the
measurability of sets are omitted.
2 Non-relativistic Bohmian mechanics
Let us assume that the universe is a non-relativistic quantum system of N particles. The
configuration space of the system is X := R3N . Let us also introduce the kinematic space
of the system, i.e., the set K of all the kinematically admissible trajectories of the system;
in this case we can define K := C0(R;X). At every time t ∈ R the quantum state of the
system is represented by a normalized vector ψt ∈ L
2(X). The time evolution of ψt is
determined by a Hamiltonian of the form
H = −
N∑
i=1
~2
2mi
∆i + V (x). (1)
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A probability density and a probability current can be naturally derived from the wave
function:
ρt(x) := |ψt(x)|
2, (2)
jit(x) :=
~
mi
Imψ∗t (x)∇iψt(x), i = 1, . . . , N. (3)
These satisfy the continuity equation
ρ˙t +∇ · jt = 0, (4)
where jt := (j1t, . . . , jNt). A Bohmian trajectory is a trajectory k ∈ K satisfying the
guiding equation
k˙(t) =
jt(k(t))
ρt(k(t))
. (5)
Let B denote the set of the Bohmian trajectories. For K ⊆ K we define Kt := {k(t) ∈ X :
k ∈ K}. One can prove that
Pt(Bt) = Pt′(Bt′) for all B ⊆ B and t, t
′ ∈ R, (6)
where Pt is the probability measure on X induced by ρt. This property is referred to as
equivariance. It follows that the set B is naturally endowed with the probability measure
P (B) := Pt(Bt), where B ⊆ B. (7)
The probability space
(B, P ) (8)
will be referred to as the Bohmian space.
The Bohmian space is assumed to be a model of the universe in the sense that the
actual evolution of the universe is assumed to be represented by a trajectory chosen at
random from B.
The random choice is governed by the probability measure P as follows: (1) the
probability P defines the typical subsets of B, i.e., the sets B ⊆ B such that P (B) ≈ 1;
(2) the typical sets govern the random choice according to Cournot’s principle, which
states what follows: we can be practically certain that an element chosen at random from
B belongs to a typical subset of B singled out in advance or independently with respect
to the random choice [15, 9].
The Bohmian space is an empirically adequate model because the (vaguely defined)
set of the physical trajectories, i.e., the trajectories which give the correct results in the
experiments, is typical. This result is proved in [7].
It has already been noted in the literature that the additive structure of a probability
measure has no relevance for the definition of the typical sets and therefore these sets
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could be defined by non-additive set functions as well [10, 11, 9]. This will be the case
with the no-law model defined in Section 4. Also in that case the connection between
typical sets and random choice is given by Cournot’s principle.
3 Relativistic Bohmian mechanics
Let us now assume that the universe is a system of N > 1 non-interacting fermions. The
formulation of relativistic Bohmian mechanics for this system is based on the hypersurface
Bohm-Dirac model [4].
Let M := R × R3 denote the Minkowski spacetime, Σ a smooth space-like hypersur-
face of M (hereafter simply hypersurface), and F a foliation of hypersurfaces [4]. The
configuration space of the system is XΣ := Σ
N , which in the relativistic case depends
on the hypersurface. The kinematic space K is the set of the N -tuples of world lines1,2.
For consistency with the non-relativistic case, let us introduce the following notation: for
k = (k1, . . . , kN) ∈ K define k(Σ) := (k1 ∩ Σ, . . . , kN ∩ Σ) ∈ XΣ, and for K ⊆ K define
KΣ := {k(Σ) ∈ XΣ : k ∈ K}. Note that in the relativistic case the variable t is replaced
by the “variable” Σ.
The wave function of the system is a multi-time function ψ :MN → (C4)⊗N satisfying
the system of Dirac equations (c = ~ = 1)
(iγi · ∂i − eiγi · A(xi)−mi)ψ = 0, i = 1, . . . , N, (9)
where γi = I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I ⊗ γ ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I, with γ at the i-th of the N places, and A is an
external electromagnetic potential.
The relativistic version of the wave function ψt is ψΣ := ψ|XΣ, and the relativistic
versions of the probability density ρt and of the probability current jit are:
ρΣ(σ) := ψΣ(σ)(γ1 · nΣ(σ1)) · · · (γN · nΣ(σN ))ψΣ(σ); (10)
jiΣ(σ) := ψΣ(σ)(γ1 · nΣ(σ1)) · · ·γi · · · (γN · nΣ(σN))ψΣ(σ), i = 1, . . . , N, (11)
where σ = (σ1, . . . , σN) ∈ XΣ and nΣ(σi) is the future-oriented unit normal vector on Σ at
the point σi ∈ Σ. In [4] it is proved that ρΣ(σ) ≥ 0. Moreover, by applying the divergence
theorem to the divergence-free tensor ψ(x)γµ1
1
· · · γµNN ψ(x) one can prove that the integral∫
XΣ
ρΣ d
3Nσ (12)
does not depend on Σ, and it will be assumed to be equal to 1. In regard to the probability
current, one can prove that jiΣ(σ) is a future-oriented non space-like 4-vector [4].
1In the relativistic formulation the symbols K and B are redefined.
2Here a world line is considered to be a subset of M , and its intersection with any hypersurface is
exactly one point.
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An important fact of relativistic Bohmian mechanics is that, in general, no probability
space (B, P ) exists, where B ⊆ K, such that
P (B) = PΣ(BΣ) for all B ⊆ B and all Σ, (13)
where PΣ is the probability measure on XΣ induced by ρΣ. This corresponds to the fact
that “Quantum equilibrium cannot hold in all Lorentz frames” [2]. However, if a foliation
is chosen, a relativistic version of the Bohmian space (8) can be obtained.
Let F be a given foliation; the Bohmian trajectories relative to F are the trajectories
k = (k1, . . . , kN) ∈ K satisfying
k˙i(Σ) ∝ jiΣ(k(Σ)) for all Σ ∈ F and i = 1, . . . , N, (14)
where k˙i(Σ) is the future-oriented unit vector tangent to ki at the point ki ∩Σ. Equation
(14) is the relativistic version of the guiding equation. Let BF denote the set of the
Bohmian trajectories defined in this way; one can prove that [4]:
PΣ(BΣ) = PΣ′(BΣ′) for all B ⊆ BF and Σ,Σ
′ ∈ F . (15)
This equation is the relativistic version of the equivariance equation (6). A probability
measure PF on BF is then naturally defined by
PF(B) := PΣ(BΣ), where B ⊆ BF and Σ ∈ F . (16)
The probability space (BF , PF) will be referred to as a relativistic Bohmian space.
Note that it may be that BF∩BF ′ 6= ∅ for F 6= F
′. In fact, if k is a Bohmian trajectory
generated by a foliation F , and F ′ is a foliation obtained by changing any leaf Σ of F
somewhere or everywhere with the exception of a neighborhood of k1(Σ)∪. . .∪kN(Σ), then
F ′ also generates k. It will be assumed without proof that all the foliations generating k
can be constructed in this way. One easily see that this defines a synchronization [2] for
the N world lines of k. In conclusion, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
trajectories and foliations, but any trajectory of ∪FBF is endowed with a synchronization.
In order to study the behavior of the space (BF , PF) under Poincare´ transformations,
let us temporarily denote it by (Bψ
F
, P
ψ
F
), where the dependence on the wave function is
made explicit (the ψ-dependence will generally be omitted in the notation, and will be
restored only when the transformation properties are considered). A Poincare´ transfor-
mation g on M acts naturally on any subset of K and on any foliation and acts on ψ by
means of a suitable representation Ug of the Poincare´ group. One can prove that
gB
ψ
F
= B
Ugψ
gF and P
ψ
F
(B) = P
Ugψ
gF (gB), where B ⊆ B
ψ
F
. (17)
These equations show that the relativistic Bohmian spaces are covariant.
As pointed out in the introduction, any space (BF , PF) could be an empirically ade-
quate model of the universe, in the sense that any foliation could be the preferred foliation
(if a preferred foliation does exist). This implies in particular that the set of the physical
trajectories of any space (BF , PF) is typical.
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4 The no-law model
Let us assume the no-law hypothesis, i.e., there is no law for the foliations, neither dy-
namical nor statistical. The absence of a dynamical law implies that all the foliations are
allowed3. As a consequence all the trajectories of the space
B := ∪FBF (18)
are dynamically allowed, and therefore B becomes the sample space of the no-law model.
Let us define the typical subsets of B as follows: a set B ⊆ B is typical if
PF (B ∩ BF ) ≈ 1 for all F . (19)
This definition can be justified as follows. Let F denote the set of the foliations. According
to the no-law hypothesis no probability measure is defined on F. If instead a probability
measure were defined, the typical sets of B could be easily defined. In fact, a probability
measure µ on F induces the probability measure
Pµ(B) :=
∫
F
PF (B ∩ BF )dµ(F) (20)
on B. It is easy to see that a set B is typical according to Pµ for any µ if and only if the
condition (19) is satisfied. The condition (19) therefore defines the typical sets indepen-
dently from any probability measure on F, and therefore it is a reasonable definition of
typicality also in absence of any probability measure.
In order to express the condition (19) in a more synthetic way let us introduce the set
function
P∗(B) := inf
F
PF (B ∩ BF ), where B ⊆ B. (21)
One can easily prove that
P∗(∅) = 0, P∗(B) = 1, and P∗(B) ≤ P∗(B
′) for B ⊆ B′. (22)
Moreover P∗ is superadditive, i.e., P∗(B ∪ B
′) ≥ P∗(B) + P∗(B
′) for B ∩ B′ = ∅. This
set function is very similar to the lower probability set function utilized in the theory
of imprecise probability [13]. Since P∗(B) ≈ 1 ⇔ PF(B ∩ BF ) ≈ 1 ∀ F , the typicality
condition (19) can be expressed as
P∗(B) ≈ 1. (23)
3This point can be better understood by means of the following analogy: in non-relativistic Bohmian
mechanics the set B defined in Section 2 is the set of the trajectories which are dynamically allowed by
the guiding equation. If the guiding equation is removed as a law, the set of the allowed trajectories
becomes the entire kinematic space K.
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In conclusion, the no-law model is the space
(B, P∗). (24)
One can easily prove that the space (Bψ, P ψ∗ ) is covariant, that is:
gBψ = BUgψ and P ψ∗ (B) = P
Ugψ
∗ (gB), where B ⊆ B
ψ. (25)
The actual trajectory of the universe is assumed to be a trajectory chosen at random
from B, where the random choice is governed by the set function P∗ according the typi-
cality condition (23). Since there is not a one-to-one correspondence between trajectories
and foliations, the random choice of a trajectory from B does not imply that a foliation
is also chosen, and therefore one cannot say that a particular foliation is realized (see
also the remark below). Recall however that every trajectory of B is endowed with a
synchronization.
The empirical adequacy of the space (B, P∗), i.e., the fact that the subset of the physical
trajectories of this space is typical, descends trivially from the fact that the subset of the
physical trajectories of any space (BF , PF) is typical.
In the derivation of the space (B, P∗) it has been implicitly assumed that the foliations
are not part of the primitive ontology of the model [1]. In other words, they are assumed
to have the same ontological nature of the wave function or of the probability measure,
and not that of the trajectories. This also makes acceptable the fact that no particular
foliation is realized.
A different model is derived if instead the foliations are assumed to be part of the
primitive ontology. In this case they have to be included in the sample space, which
becomes:
B
′ := ∪F{F} × BF . (26)
The typical subsets of B′ are defined by the set function
P ′∗(B) := inf
F
PF(BF), (27)
where B ⊆ B′ and BF := {k ∈ K : (F , k) ∈ B}. Unlike the first model, in this model the
random choice of an element from B′ also includes the choice of a foliation, and therefore
in this case a particular foliation is realized.
The two models are however very similar, both from the formal and from the concep-
tual point of view. For example, even if in the first model the random choice does not
include a foliation, the fact that any trajectory of B is endowed with a synchronization
makes the two models very similar in regard to their compatibility with relativity.
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5 Discussion
Let us discuss first the following possible objection: also according to the no-law model
the actual trajectory of the universe has a preferred synchronization, and this structure is
conceptually very similar to a foliation. This essentially contradicts the title of the paper.
A possible reply is the following. Usually the elements composing a theory can be
classified at two different levels, namely the law-level and the instance-level. For example,
in a theory based on a differential equation, the differential equation is at the law-level,
while the single solutions are at the instance-level; in a theory based on a probability
space, the sample space and the probability measure are at the law-level, while the single
outcomes are at the instance-level. Various properties and features of a theory can be
classified analogously.
In the formulation of relativistic Bohmian mechanics proposed in [5], in which a single
preferred foliation is derived from the universal wave function, the preferred foliation is
certainly at the law-level. On the contrary, in the no-law model the preferred synchro-
nization is certainly at the instance-level. I argue that a theory can be qualified as a
theory with a preferred foliation/synchronization only if such a structure is defined at the
law-level.
In order to support this conclusion consider the following example. Einstein’s equa-
tions are at the law-level of general relativity, while single solutions of these equations
are at the instance-level. It is well known that any solutions with an initial singularity
(Big Bang) defines a preferred foliation, namely the foliation composed of the surfaces of
constant time-like distance from the singularity. General relativity may therefore have
preferred foliations at the instance-level, but certainly it cannot be qualified as a theory
with a preferred foliation.
Let us now discuss the compatibility of the no-law model with relativity. The authors
of [5] distinguish between a Lorentz invariant theory and a fundamentally relativistic
theory. Lorentz invariance is a well defined formal property which basically corresponds to
equations (25), and therefore the no-law model is Lorentz invariant. On the contrary, there
is not an obvious criterion which states clearly if a theory is fundamentally relativistic or
not, so that only intuitive considerations are possible here.
The fact that the actual trajectory of the universe is endowed with a preferred synchro-
nization seems to be incompatible with fundamental relativity. On the other hand, the
fact that the preferred synchronization is at the instance-level could reduce this incom-
patibility. The example of general relativity is also useful in this case: there are solutions
of Einstein’s equations which define a preferred foliation, but certainly general relativity
is compatible with fundamental relativity.
Let us now address the main motivation for the no-law hypothesis, namely the em-
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pirical irrelevance of any law for the foliation. In fact, since the foliations are completely
unobservable, such a law cannot be even approximately empirically verified; moreover it
can be ignored without any loss of predictive power, because any space (BF , PF) could be
an empirically adequate model of the universe.
Since empirical irrelevance is a criticism which is often (incorrectly) raised against the
guiding equation of Bohmian mechanics, which is the dynamical law for the trajectories, it
is useful to emphasize the difference between the two situations. First of all, unlike folia-
tions, Bohmian trajectories are not completely unobservable. In fact only the microscopic
details of a trajectory are unobservable, while its macroscopic structure determines the
observable trajectories of the macroscopic bodies. As a consequence, even if we cannot
be certain that the guiding equation is exact, we can at least verify it on the macroscopic
level. Second, the role of the guiding equation is to define a set of trajectories, i.e., it par-
ticipates in the definition of a model. On the contrary, the role of a law for the foliation is
to select a model from an already existing class of empirically equivalent models, namely
the class {(BF , PF)}F∈F. For this reason, unlike the law for the foliation, the guiding
equation cannot be ignored without a radical loss of predictive power. For example, if the
guiding equation is ignored, the quasi-classical evolution of the macroscopic world can no
longer be predicted.
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